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--------------------- JAY C. CARLISLE* 
, White Plains 
Ex Parte Communication 
by the Judiciary 
12 
Introduction 
The recent establishment of an Individual Assignment System in New York has in-
troduced what one commentator 
has referred to as new "rules of the 
game".1 Nonetheless, the old rules 
still apply with respect to ex parte 
communication by judges which is 
governed by Canon 3(A)( 4) of the 
Code of Judicial Conduct. Canon 
3(A)(4), as adopted by the New 
York State Bar Association in 1973, 
prohibits a judge from initiating or 
considering exparte communica-
tions concerning a pending or im-
pending proceeding. This prohibi-
tion, which has been strictly con-
strued by decisional law and bar 
association advisory opinions, has 
new significance under the lAS 
because of the new system's man-
date that there be continuous super-
vision of each case by a single 
judge.2 
Part I: Historical Perspective 
Toward Ex Parte 
Communication 
"It is of course true that most 
judges are influenced only by what 
they see and hear in Court."3 
Nonetheless it is common 
knowledge that a judge often seeks 
the aid and assistance of others out-
side the courtroom.4 As former 
Chief Judge Charles Breitel of the 
New York State Court of Appeals 
has remarked, "The impulse for 
seeking assistance, of course, is the 
desire to learn and to make sure that 
one's reasoning and conclusions will 
more likely be correct. This is done 
quite often, from what I learn."s 
• Professor Jay C. Carlisle has A.B. and J.D. 
degrees from the University of California. He 
has taught courses in Civil Procedure, New 
York Practice and Professional Responsibility 
at the Pace University School of Law. A Revi-
sion Author for the Weinstein, Korn and 
Miller treatise on New York Civil Practice, he 
is a member of the Grievance Committee and 
the Ethics Committee for the Westchester 
County Bar Association. 
1 Martin A. Fox, Comment on McLoughlin 
v. Henke (NY Law Journal Vol. 195, No. 32 
p. 1 col. 3, Feb. 19,1986). 
2 22 NYCRR 202.3(A). 
3 Cox v. Louisiana 379 U.S. 559, 563 (1965). 
4 Address by Hon. Charles Breitel to a con-
ference on Judicial Ethics at the Chicago Law 
School reprinted in 154 N.L.J. 1 (Oct. 8, 
1965). 
sId. 
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Canon 3(A)(4) of the Code of 
Judicial Conduct specifically pro-
hibits ex parte communication be-
tween a judge and a lawyer in any 
pending or impending proceeding; 
however, a judge may under some 
circumstances obtain the advice of a 
disinterestE:d expert on the law ap-
plicable to the proceeding. 6 Canon 
3(A)(4) was drafted by the 
American Bar Association's Special 
Committee on Judicial Conduct, 
and was adopted by the ABA's 
House of Delegates in 1972. Subsec-
tion 4 of the Canon is based in part 
on old Canon 11' of the Canons of 
Judicial Ethics. Canon 17, entitled 
"Ex Parte Communication" was 
adopted in 1924 by the American 
Bar Association and remained vir-
tually unchanged for nearly half a 
century. Canon 17 specifically pro-
hibited all communications, 
arguments, and interviews for the 
purpose of assisting a judge in the 
rendering of a decision unless 
representatives of all interested par-
ties were actually present at such 
time. 
The very strict and limited terms 
of Canon 17 provoked a good 
number of judges to ignore it. Over 
40 years after the enactment of 
Canon 17, a distinguished judge 
from the New York State Court of 
Appeals admitted that "the rule can-
not be applied absolutely, nor 
should it be. There are unusual cases 
where a judge ought to be permitted 
to probe for a consensus where a 
consensus is relevant, or where at-
tenuated analysis ought to be 
tested."8 It has also been frequently 
observed that the published cor-
respondence of some of our nation's 
greatest judges includes many ex-
amples of generalized discussions 
with outsiders about pending cases.9 
Few guidelines were available to 
help judges decide whether or not 
their performance met the letter and 
spirit of Canon 17. It was obvious 
that in a proceeding, ex parte com-
munications by a judge to a party or 
his lawyer or by a party or his 
lawyer to the judge clearly should 
14 
be precluded,IO but it was not clear if 
such transactions as a telephone call 
by the judge to a law professor to 
obtain advice on a contested issue 
within the area of the professor's ex-
pertise, or consultation by the judge 
with another judge not on the same 
panel or the same court would be 
permitted. 11 The onus was therefore 
placed on the Special Committee on 
Standards of Judicial Conduct to set 
forth a more flexible and easily used 
procedure, one which would meet 
the stringent standards of Canon 17, 
but provide for certain instances 
where a judge would be permitted to 
consult with a disinterested expert 
on the law, perhaps even in an 
emergency situation by telephoneY 
Professor E. Wayne Thode, 
Reporter to the Special Committee 
on Judicial Standards, stated that 
during the meetings of the Special 
Committee which was convened to 
study and revise the Canons of 
Judicial Ethics, it was argued that 
the gathering of advice from 
disinterested experts on the law 
should be permitted with respect to 
a proceeding before a judge.13 The 
Committee recognized both the 
possibility that such extra-judicial 
consultations might lead to improv-
ed decisions and the possibility for a 
breakdown of the adversary system 
inherent in these suggestions. 
Naturally, one way to allow outside 
input was to invite parties to file 
Amicus Curiae briefs. However, 
this was recognized as being "too 
formal, time-consuming, and 
cumbersome a procedure to be 
useful in every situation." 14 It was 
thus determined at the first meeting 
of the Special Committee that revi-
sion of the old Canons would not 
suffice because "neither the form or 
the style of the old Canons of 
Judicial Ethics was satisfactory ."15 It 
was concluded that the Special 
Committee should start anew. 
Part II: The Solution 
Proffered By Canon 3(A)(4) 
A. The Intended Results 
The solution proffered by the 
Special Committee to the dilemma 
surrounding ex parte communica-
tions was Canon 3(A)(4) of the 
Code of Judicial Conduct. This 
established the Code as the Official 
Statement of the ABA on Judicial 
Ethics but did not make it binding in 
any jurisdiction. Shortly thereafter, 
the Judicial Conference of the 
United States adopted the Code as 
the governing authority on Judicial 
Ethics for all federal judges (except 
justices of the Supreme Court who 
are not under the jursidiction of 
Judicial Conference), full-time 
referees on bankruptcy, and fu11-
time Magistrates, with some 
modifications.16 In November 1972, 
the Supreme Court of Colorado 
became the first state court to adopt 
the code. Today, virtually every 
jurisdiction has adopted the Code in 
part or in full, some modifying it, 
others adopting parts of it. Some 
states like Wisconsin and Illinois, 
recently adopted new Codes of their 
own, and others like Maryland and 
Rhode Island, integrated parts of the 
Code of Judicial Conduct with parts 
of the old Canons of Judicial Ethics. 
Canon 3(A)(4) was adopted by the 
New York State Bar Association on 
March 3, 1973. 
Canon 3(A)(4) can be segregated 
into two parts. The first sentence 
sets forth the adjudicative respon-
sibilities under the Canon and the 
second sentence recites a suggestion 
for a workable method for engaging 
6 Commentary to Canon 3(A)(4). 
7 Canon 17 of Judicial Ethics as pro· 
mulgated in 1924 by the ABA and as amend· 
ed in 193762 ABA reports 352, 767. 
8 See Note 4, supra. 
9 [d. 
10 Commentary to Canon 3(A)(4). 
11 Id. 
12 Id. 
13 E. Wayne Thode, Reporter's Notes to Code 0) 
ludicial Conduct (1973). 
14 [d. 
15 [d. 
16 Report of the Judicial Conference of thE 
United States, pp. 9-11, 52 (1973); Report of 
the Judicial Conference of the United States, 
p. 17 (1974). 
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extrajudicial aid while not com-
promising the rights of the parties. 
The rules of Conduct found in the 
first sentence of the Canon are 
likewise twofold. Initially, it is 
stated that a judge should accord 
every interested person (or his 
lawyer) a "full right to be heard ac-
cording to the law". This require-
ment covers a vast area of judicial 
activities and has been applied 
several times in judicial proceedings 
in New York.17 The second part of 
adjudica tive responsibilities re-
quired by Canon 3(A)(4) deals with 
ex parte communication and states 
that it is expressly prohibited. It 
specifically allows a judge to receive 
the opinion of a disinterested expert, 
as long as the fact that such an opin-
ion sought is conveyed to the par-
ties, and they are given an oppor-
tunity to respond. The Canon's 
Commentary states that the prohibi-
tion against seeking advise on pend-
ing or impending proceedings in-
cludes advice gathered from lawyers 
and law teachers. Advice gained 
from other judges and court person-
nel is permissible. The filing of an 
amicus curiae brief is favored, but 
the procedure is by no means 
limited. 
B. The Effect of 3(A)(4) On 
Would Be Communicators 
When applying the rules govern-
ing ex parte Communication under 
Canon 3(A)(4), two basic observa-
tions come to mind: first, an objec-
tive standard was needed for 
evaluating the performance of 
judges in this area and such a stan-
dard has been set forth by the 
Code;18 second, it is clear that the 
Code provides for disciplinary ac-
tion against a judge to be carried out 
by the Advisory Committee of a 
particular jurisdiction. However, 
the judicial action on the part of a 
particular case handled by a judge 
under investigation is subject to 
regular channels of appeal. 19 
C. Specific Applications of 
Canon 3(A)(4) 
Although there are few New 
York cases interpreting Canon 
3(A)(4), it has been held that a judge 
cannot reduce a felony charge, on 
defense counsel's request, without 
consulting with the district at-
torney,2O and it is clear that a judge 
is prohibited from consulting law 
professors or legislators in connec-
tion with pending cases.21 However, 
ex parte communications with a 
judge have been condoned in some 
situations. In B.C. Equipment Co., 
Inc. v. American Insurance Co., 22 
the Appellate Division for the 
Fourth Department held that the ex 
parte submission by the plaintiff of 
a trial memorandum did not war-
rant a mistrial because it found that 
the trial judge had not been unfairly 
influenced by the ex parte com-
munication. More recently, in Peo-
ple v. Insignares,23 the Appellate 
Division for the First Department 
held that an ex parte report by a 
special counsel appointed by the 
trial judge did not violate the pro-
hibitions set forth in Canon 3(A)(4) 
but was merely a factor to be con-
sidered in determining whether the 
judge had abused his discretion in 
favoring one party over the other. 
Other exceptions to the general rule 
against ex parte contacts with a 
j\ldge include those authorized by 
law. For example, ex parte motions 
under C.P.L.R. 2212(b) and 
2213(b); provisional remedies under 
C.P.L.R. 6211 and 6313; and ap-
plications under Rule 6S(b) of the 
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure are 
authorized by statute. Examples of 
ex parte submissions that may be 
permitted under substantive legal 
and equitable principles are found in 
proceedings involving claimed 
privileges or claimed trade secrets. 24 
Committees on Professional 
Ethics for the New York County 
Lawyers' Association, the Associa-
tion of the Bar of the City of New 
York, and the New York State Bar 
Association have issued ethical 
opinions expressly prohibiting ex 
parte submissions of trial brief, 
memoranda and other communica-
NEW YORK STATE BAR JOURNAL November 1986 
tion.25 These opinions rest on the ra-
tionale that a first impression con-
veyed in an ex parte submission, 
however unfair or erroneous, may 
be decisive, or that a judge may be 
influenced by matters that never 
should have come to his attention. 
Thus mere notice to one's adversary 
of an ex parte contact with a judge 
may not be sufficient because a par-
ty who does not wish to consent to 
it may be in the position of an-
tagonizing the judge. In addition, 
there is an abundance of decisional 
law from other jurisdictions that 
provide guidance to the New York 
bar.26 
In two related cases,27 two 
justices of the Supreme Court of 
17 Application of Wefngarten, 94 Misc.2d 
788, 405 N.r.S.2d 605 (Ct. Cl. N.Y. 1978); 
.?engstack v. Sengstack, 4 N.Y.2d 502, 176 
N.Y.S.2d 337 (1958); Matter pf Waltermade, 
409 N.Y.S.2d 991 (Court on the Judiciary, 
1975). 
18 B.C. Equipment Co., Inc. v. American 
Ins. Co. 61 A.D.2d 247, 402 N.Y.S.2d 479 
(4th Dept. 1978), aff'd., 46 N.Y.2d 811, 413 
N.Y.S.2d 922 (1978). 
19 Antoci v. Antoci, 113 A.D. 2d 857, 493 
N.Y.S. 2c! 588 (2d Dept., 1985). 
20 Murtagh v. Maglio, 9" A.D.2d 915, 195 
N.Y.S.2d 900 (2d. Dept. 1960) See also Com-
mittee on Professional Ethics of the New 
York State Bar Association, Opinion No. 
420. 
21 Matter of Fuchsberg, U.S. v. Diaz (slip 
opinion 86-1126, 2d Cir., Augustl, 1986). 
179 N.Y.L.J. 1 (March 17, 1978). 
22 61 A.D.2d 247, 402 NYS2d. 479 (4th Dept. 
1978), aff'd., 46 N.Y.2d 811, 413 N.Y.S.2d 
922 (1978). 
23 109 A.D.2d. 221, 491 N.Y.S.2d 166 (1st 
Dept. 1985). 
24 Opinio~ No. 887, Th~ Committee on Pro-
fessional and Judicial Ethics of the Associa-
tion of the Bar of the City of New York. 
25 Id.; Opinion No. 221 of the Committee on 
Professional Ethics of the New York County 
Lawyers' Association; Opinion 325 of the 
Committee on Professional Ethics of the New 
York StlJte Bar Association. 
26 For a general discussion of cases where 
judges initiated ex parte communicatiQns see: 
In re Scott386 N.E.2d 218 (Mass. 1979); In re 
Stuhl 233 S.E.2d 562 (N.C. 1977); In re 
Nowell 237 S.E.2d 250 (N.C. 1977); In re 
Hardy 240 S.E.2d 373 (N.C. 1978); In re Mar-
tin 245 S.E.2d 773 (N.C. 1978); In,re Peoples 
250 S.E.2d 915 (N.C. 1978); In re Laster 274 
N.W.2d 745 (Mich. 1979); Matter of Buford 
577 S.W.2d 809 (Mo. 1979) , 
27 In re Deckle 308 So.2d 5 (Fla. 1975); In re 
Boyd 308 So.2d 13 (Fla. 1975). 
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Judiciary 
Continued from Page 15 
Florida were considering a public 
utility rate matter, and had taken 
opposing sides of the issue. A 
lawyer who was a friend of one of 
the two discussed the pending case 
with him on the golf course and 
prepared a memorandum at the 
justice's request. The judge subse-
quently considered the memoran-
dum and then destroyed it for fear 
that he would be disciplined later, as 
he was. However, because it was 
believed that outside pressures lead 
to the destruction of the evidence 
imd because the opinion rendered 
by the judge disagreed with the 
memorandum, testifying to the fact 
that it played no part in his opinion, 
the judge was merely publicly cen-
sured and not removed. Perhaps of 
more relevance is the case of the 
other Florida judge, who picked up 
a memorandum from his cluttered 
desk, apparently several months 
after it had been placed there 
without the judge's knowledge. He 
assumed it was a properly filed 
amicus curiae brief or other docu-
ment which belonged with the file of 
the pending case and considered it in 
his opinion. The memorandum ac-
tually figured very heavily in the 
opinion developed by the judge and 
was so convincing that he was in-
structed by the Chief Justice to con-
vert it into a majority opinion. After 
discovering the origin of the 
memorandum, the opinion was 
rewritten to make no mention 
thereof. The judge was censured as 
well, even though it was not 
established that he intended to 
misuse the paper. 
In re Edens,zs a North Carolina 
court determined that a judge who 
sets a sentence without notifying 
one of the parties counsel had 
violated Canon 3(A)(4). A judge in 
Massachusetts was removed from 
office and later disbarred in another 
proceeding, after a case dealing with 
54 
twenty-two specific counts of 
misconduct; only two of which 
dealt with Canon 3(A)(4). The judge 
had used the services of a court of-
ficer and attorney without disclos-
ing their relationship with him, and 
he set bail without allowing the 
defendant to speak.29 In a driving 
privilege case, a North Carolina 
judge was censured for com-
municating ex parte with counsel for 
defendant in a pending matter and 
for deciding issues of fact and law 
based on this communication.30 The 
Chief Justice of the Supreme Judicial 
Court of Massachusetts was public-
ly censured and suspended for a 
period of time for attending a fund 
raiser for litigants in a pending case, 
thus communicating ex parte and 
putting his neutrality in question.31 
Part III: Some Objections to 
Canon 3(A)(4) 
With Canon 3(A)(4) "a method 
is established whereby a judge may 
consult· with a disinterested person 
on issues of law, but he must give 
notice of the name of the person 
consulted and the substance of the 
advice received."32 But, is this 
limitation flexible enough? Pro-
fessor Grossman would add a 
sentence to the end of Canon 
3(A)(4) inviting judges to take ad-
vantage of the procedure described 
and to use whatever resources 
available to enhance a judge's abili-
ty to decide a case justly.J3 This, it is 
felt, would broaden a judge's 
horizons and perspectives and give 
him the time to do so. On the other 
hand, to permit a judge to obtain 
facts and opinions from any source 
would lead to a basic change in our 
adversarial system. 
Canon 3(A)(4) has authorized a 
judge to receive advice after meeting 
the two requirements of notice to 
the parties and supplying an oppor-
tunity for response. Implicit in these 
requirements is the notion that such 
advice could be gathered over the 
telephone as well as in person.34 This 
procedure will preserve the adver-
sary process and allow a judge to 
obtain outside expert aid which 
would not otherwise be available. 
The parties are, in effect, given a 
choice as to whether to allow ex 
parte communication, with notice 
and opportunity to respond, or else 
have the impending case free of such 
communications. If the judge or the 
expert does not want the name of 
the expert to be known, the notice 
requirement has not been met and 
the communication cannot be ac-
cepted by the judge.35 
Conclusion 
Judges should be careful not to 
initiate or accept any ex parte com-
munication from anyone other than 
a judicial colleague or appropriate 
court officer. In the event other ex 
parte communication is necessary, 
the notice and hearing requirements 
of Canon 3(A)(4) must be strictly 
adheredto. 36 
ZS 290 N.C. 299, 226, S.E.2d 5 (1976). 
29 In re Troy, 364 Mass. IS, 300 N.E.2d 159 
(1973). 
30 In re Crutchfield 289 N.C. 577, 223, 
S.E.2d 822 (1975). 
31 Matter of Bonin, 375 Mass. 680, 378 
N.E.2d 669 (1978). See also Wise, "New Rule 
Clarifies Activities For Judges Running For 
Office," N.Y.L.J. (August I, 1986, p. 1) 
(§100.7 of the Rules of the Chief Ad-
ministrator Governing Judicial Conduct, 
relating to political activity of judges, amend-
ed to provide for new rules restricting their 
political activities.) 
32 9 San Diego Rev. 793 (1972). 
33 Id. at 803. 
34 Id. 
35 See ABA Informal Opinion 1346 (Nov. 26, 
1975) 
36 See also note 31, supra. 
____________________ 1 fin, 
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